Intelligence Reform Held Hostage

A classic Washington turf war is threatening to derail a bipartisan compromise in Congress to fix the intelligence gaps that contributed to the attacks of 9/11.

The deal -- made by leaders of both parties and endorsed by the president, the vice president, the bipartisan 9/11 commission, most of the families of 9/11 victims and bipartisan congressional negotiators -- would establish a director of national intelligence in charge of all of the government’s intelligence gathering, analysis and counter-terrorism operations.

Despite the overwhelming support for this reform, two powerful congressmen are blocking the way. One is a Californian, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-El Cajon).

Hunter feels strongly that such a reform would “cut the lifeline” between spy satellites and the troops on the ground -- a concern I understand, but one with which I profoundly disagree.

The congressman’s objection is based on a flawed understanding of how our military utilizes intelligence satellites. He asserts that the Defense secretary would lose the ability to control these satellites during wartime. But the truth is the Defense secretary doesn’t control these satellites today.

Under the National Security Act of 1947 and several executive orders, the responsibility for controlling intelligence satellites rests solely with the director of central intelligence, not the Defense secretary. The law provides an exception that allows the president to transfer this control to the Defense secretary, but this has never happened.

Thus, during the 1991 Gulf War, the Bosnia and Kosovo wars and the war in Iraq, our intelligence satellites were always controlled by our nation’s intelligence chief. And in each war, the director of central intelligence has given our military the highest priority, ensuring that the Pentagon’s requirements were satisfied first.

So what might Hunter really be after?

Perhaps he wants to increase the Pentagon’s control over our nation’s intelligence collection systems, including our satellites. This would fundamentally change the way we have operated for 50 years. Perhaps he wants to give the House Armed Services Committee -- which he chairs -- more control over intelligence and therefore even more control over our national security programs and the all-important money that funds them.

What Hunter fails to appreciate is that the compromise reached by congressional negotiators would not touch the military’s access to tactical battlefield intelligence.

The legislation would streamline and unify our intelligence-gathering capabilities, foster greater intelligence sharing and shatter the “stovepipes” -- where information is shared within agencies but not across agencies -- that plague the system. In this way, the legislation would improve the overall quality of our intelligence.

Congress should be permitted to vote on this historic legislation when it returns to Washington next week. If the Armed Services Committee chairman wishes to vote against it, he is free to. But he should not be free to block a national mandate that most, including the president, strongly believe will make our nation safer.