PERSPECTIVE ON ROSS PEROT : A Loose Cannon From Dallas : A Reagan White House memo shows him acting as middleman during the Iran-Contra investigations.

What frightens me about Ross Perot as President is not that he takes foolish, and even bizarre, steps to protect his family from mythical threats, but that there is direct evidence that six years ago he interjected himself inappropriately, and perhaps illegally, into one of the nation’s most serious crises: Iran-Contra. He may not have even known what he was doing.

My Perot story begins two years ago. While researching a magazine article on the Iran-Contra scandal, I learned that some investigators on the Senate and House Iran-Contra committees were convinced that Perot had offered hush money in what they thought was an attempt to cover up his and President Reagan’s activities on behalf of the hostages.

The committees had evidence, which still has not been made public, showing that Perot had offered in December, 1986--at the height of interest in the scandal--to pay legal fees for the two key witnesses, Adm. John M. Poindexter and Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, if they would protect the President by not testifying truthfully. The package included providing for their families if they were given jail terms and helping them find new careers.

I interviewed Perot at the time and he was, as he appears on television, seemingly honest and to the point. What he said, however, was nonsensical and contradicted by evidence.

Told of the committees’ suspicions, Perot almost casually admitted making the payment offers to North and Poindexter, but insisted he did so solely in an effort to get out the full story: “I went to both men and told them that if they tell the truth, I’d pay all their legal expenses and see that they got jobs. I thought it looks terrible for two military officers to take the Fifth Amendment.”

Perot said his offers of support were based on the belief that “everybody knew what was going on” and the future of the President “was not at issue. It’s a dumb thing,” he added. “I couldn’t figure out why telling the truth would hurt the presidency.”

In the same interview, however, Perot made clear why the truth would have been devastating to President Reagan. He revealed, again almost casually, that Reagan had provided Jay Coburn, a close Perot aide, with a letter of safe conduct before the aide flew to Europe in 1985 with $2 million of Perot’s money for use as ransom in a highly secret White House operation to rescue Americans held in Lebanon, an operation deemed illegal by the Iran-Contra committees. “The letter was in case Coburn was stopped going through Customs carrying that much cash. And,” Perot added in his cryptic fashion, “I don’t think it was signed by automatic pen.”

It was mind-boggling. Perot had to know that revelation of the letter would have been exceedingly damaging in late 1986 to Reagan, who was emphatically denying any personal knowledge of ransom efforts for hostages.

As I assessed it two years ago (talk about bad judgment), Perot seemed an odd number who--could it be?--somehow was unable to comprehend the inappropriateness of his actions; Reagan was out of office; nobody cared much anyway about Iran-Contra, and so I dropped any mention of his involvement in my New York Times Magazine article, which was highly critical of the way the congressional committees did their job.

Here’s what I should have written:

The Iran-Contra investigators had a different interpretation of Perot’s action that was triggered by their sense of the possible illegalities of the ransom effort as well as the previously unpublished contemporary office notes of Donald T. Regan, Reagan’s chief of staff. The notes showed that Regan had been assured by Perot that Poindexter would not damage the President, according to Pamela J. Naughton, a former assistant U.S. attorney in San Diego then investigating the suspected White House cover-up.

Naughton this week recalled that Regan’s notes showed that Perot telephoned Regan on Dec. 14, 1986--three weeks after the scandal became public--and told him that he (Perot) was in contact with Poindexter’s people and had this message for the President: Poindexter will testify that the President did not know of the diversion.

Regan subsequently dictated a carefully written memorandum for the record about the Perot call, in which he said that he had listened to Perot’s offer to pay all of North’s and Poindexter’s legal bills and responded that he “could not be part of any such thing.” Regan further quoted Perot as saying that “all he wants to do is get the facts out and go on with the business of governing.”

The unpublished memorandum--which I obtained only this week and which was not available to the Iran-Contra committees--showed, however, that Regan and Perot understood that North and Poindexter had no intention of hurting the President. “I thought John Poindexter would like to say he didn’t investigate the situation and didn’t tell the President about it,” the Regan memo said. “I said North probably despaired of (House Speaker) Tip O’Neill ever bringing up legislation for Contra aid so he was willing to try anything to keep a band of raggedy-ass Contras in the jungle. I reminded Ross that they were both Annapolis graduates. He said he knew this.”

The Iran-Contra investigators further learned that Perot had been in direct contact with a group of high-ranking retired admirals raising funds for Poindexter’s legal defense and suspected that Perot had offered to contribute heavily to Poindexter’s defense if he would insulate the President. Retired Rear Adm. C. A. (Mark) Hill Jr., long-time Poindexter colleague and coordinator of his defense fund, subsequently confirmed the quid pro quo of Perot’s offer--that Perot would “pay for all of John’s legal defense and a lifetime income if he would go testify--do the cover-up--without taking the Fifth.” Hill said the offer was rejected out of hand.

It was after the contact with Perot, Hill said, that he and others intensified their fund raising on behalf of the admiral. “The purpose was to preclude a flag officer from being in the pocket of Perot. If you’ve got a string on him with your money, you’ve got a control.” Perot maintains his only goal was to protect the honor of the uniform.

Poindexter did not return calls on the issue this week, but North graphically described a Perot hush-money offer in his 1991 autobiography, “Under Fire.” He wrote that Perot visited him and his attorney, Brendan V. Sullivan Jr., in Washington and said: “Why doesn’t Ollie just . . . explain to the FBI that the President didn’t know? If he goes to jail, I’ll take care of his family. And I’ll be happy to give him a job when he gets out.” Perot later denied the North-Sullivan account.

The committee was especially interested in Perot’s involvement in the operation for which his aide received a presidential note of safe conduct--a poorly conceived North hostage ransom operation in the Middle East involving two agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration. “There’s no question,” Naughton recalled, “that the DEA operation was illegal.” The White House had made no attempt to get a formal presidential finding for the covert operation, as required by law, nor was there any legal basis for using private funds for an American intelligence operation. Perot also had a motive for covering up his action, Naughton added: “He had conspiracy exposure on the money issue. If I give my money to a federal agent to investigate you, that’s a crime.”

Naughton is still convinced that a cover-up prosecution of Perot was a possibility. The essential question remains: Did Perot believe he was doing the right thing in whisking up to Washington and saying whatever he said to North, Poindexter and Regan? He is a man not bothered by, not even aware of, what he does not know, even when the gravest of constitutional and presidential crises are at stake. I don’t want his finger on the button.